The Story of Agent Orange
U.S. Veteran Dispatch Staff Report It is the war that will not end. It is the war that continues
to stalk and claim its victims decades after the last shots were fired. It is the war of rainbow herbicides, Agents Orange,
Blue, White, Purple, Green and Pink. This never-ending
legacy of the war in Vietnam has created among many veterans and their families deep feelings of mistrust of
the U.S. government for its lack of honesty in studying the effects of the rainbow herbicides, particularly
Agent Orange, and its conscious effort to cover up information and rig test results with which it does not agree.
November 1990 Issue
STUDY CANCELED On August 2, 1990, two veteran's groups
filed suit in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., charging that federal scientists canceled
an Agent Orange study mandated by Congress in 1979 because of pressure from the White House. The four year, $43 million study was canceled, according to the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) in Atlanta, because it could not accurately determine which veterans were exposed to the herbicide used to destroy
vegetation in Vietnam. The American Legion, Vietnam
Veterans of America and other veteran's groups are charging a massive government cover-up on the issue of herbicide exposure
because of the hundreds of millions of dollars in health care and disability claims that would have to be paid. The results of the scientific studies are rigged, claim many veterans,
to exonerate the government which conducted the spraying and the chemical companies which produced the herbicides. Until there
is a true study of the effects of Agent Orange, say the veterans - a study devoid of government interference and political
considerations, the war of the rainbow herbicides will go on. Charges of a White House cover-up have been substantiated by a report from the House Government Operations Committee.
That report, released August 9, 1990, charges that officials in the Reagan administration purposely
"controlled and obstructed" a federal Agent Orange study in 1987 because it did not want to admit government liability
in cases involving the toxic herbicides. Government
and industry cover-ups on Agent Orange are nothing new, though. They have been going on since before the herbicide was introduced
in the jungles of Vietnam in the early 1960s.
PLANTS GIVEN CANCER Agent Orange had its genesis as a defoliant in an obscure laboratory at the University of
Chicago during World War II. Working on experimental plant growth at the time, Professor E.J. Kraus,
chairman of the school's botany department, discovered that he could regulate the growth of plants through the infusion
of various hormones. Among the discoveries he made was that certain broadleaf vegetation could be killed by causing the plants
to experience sudden, uncontrolled growth. It was similar to giving the plants cancer by introducing specific chemicals. In
some instances, deterioration of the vegetation was noticed within 24-48 hours of the introduction of the chemicals. Kraus found that heavy doses of the chemical 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic
acid (2,4-D) could induce these growth spurts. Thinking this discovery might be of some use in the war effort, Kraus contacted
the War Department. Army scientists tested the plant hormones but found no use for them before the end of the war. Civilian scientists, however, found Kraus' plant hormones
to be of use in everyday life after the war. Chemical sprays that included 2,4-D were put on the market for use in controlling
weeds in yards, along roads and railroad rights of way.
EXPERIMENTS WITH DEADLY DEFOLIANTS The
Army continued to experiment with 2,4-D during the 1950s and late in the decade found a potent combination of chemicals which
quickly found its way into the Army's chemical arsenal. Army scientists found that by mixing 2,4-D and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T) and spraying it on plants,
there would be an almost immediate negative effect on the foliage. What they didn't realize, or chose to ignore, was that
2,4,5-T contained dioxin, a useless by-product of herbicide production. It would be twenty more years until concern was raised
about dioxin, a chemical the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would later call "one of the most perplexing and potentially
dangerous" known to man. According to the Encyclopedia
Britannica, "The toxicity of dioxin renders it capable of killing some species of newborn mammals and fish at levels
of five parts per trillion (or one ounce in six million tons). Less than two millionths of an ounce will kill a mouse. Its
toxic properties are enhanced by the fact that it can pass into the body through all major routes of entry, including the
skin (by direct contact), the lungs (by inhaling dust, fumes or vapors), or through the mouth. Entry through any of these
routes contributes to the total body burden. Dioxin is so toxic, according to the encyclopedia, because of this: "Contained
in cell membranes are protein molecules, called receptors, that normally function to move substances into the cell. Dioxin
avidly binds to these receptors and, as a result, is rapidly transported into the cytoplasm and nucleus of the cell, where
it causes changes in cellular procession." After
minimal experimentation in 1961, a variety of chemical agents was shipped to Vietnam to aid in anti-guerilla
efforts. The chemicals were to be used to destroy food sources and eliminate foliage that concealed enemy troop movements.
RAINBOW HERBICIDES The various chemicals were labeled by color-coded stripes on the
barrels, an arsenal of herbicides known by the colors of the rainbow, including Agent Blue (which contained arsenic), Agent
White, Agent Purple, and the lethal combination of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, Agent Orange. On January 13, 1962, three U.S. Air Force C-123s left Tan Son Nhut airfield to begin
Operation Hades (later called Operation Ranch Hand), the defoliation of portions of South Vietnam's
heavily forested countryside in which Viet Cong guerrillas could easily hide. By September, 1962, the spraying program had
intensified, despite an early lack of success, as U.S. officials targeted the Ca Mau Peninsula, a scene of heavy communist
activity. Ranch Hand aircraft sprayed more than 9,000 acres of mangrove forests there, defoliating approximately 95 percent
of the targeted area. That mission was deemed a success and full approval was given for continuation of Operation Ranch Hand
as the U.S. stepped up its involvement in Vietnam.
SIX TO TWENTY-FIVE TIMES Over
the next nine years, an estimated 12 million gallons of Agent Orange were sprayed throughout Vietnam.
The U.S. military command in Vietnam insisted publicly the defoliation program was militarily successful
and had little adverse impact on the economy of the villagers who came into contact with it. Although the herbicides were widely used in the United States,
they usually were heavily diluted with water or oil. In Vietnam, military applications were sprayed at the rate of three gallons
per acre and contained approximately 12 pounds of 2,4-D and 13.8 pounds of 2,3,5-T.
STRONGER THAN RECOMMENDED
The military sprayed herbicides in Vietnam
six to 25 times the rate suggested by the manufacturer. In
1962, 15,000 gallons of herbicide were sprayed throughout Vietnam. The following year that amount
nearly quadrupled, as 59,000 gallons of chemicals were poured into the forests and streams. The amounts increased significantly
after that: 175,000 gallons in 1964, 621,000 gallons in 1965 and 2.28 million gallons in 1966. The pilots who flew these missions became so proficient at their jobs that it would
take only a few minutes after reaching their target areas to dump their 1,000-gallon loads before turning for home. Flying
over portions of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia that had been sprayed, the pilots
could see the effects of their work. Many of them adopted a grim fatalism about the job. Over the door of the ready room for
Ranch Hand pilots at Tan Son Nhut Airport near
Saigon hung this sign: "Only You Can Prevent Forests."
MAKERS KNEW OF DANGER TO HUMANS Unknown to the tens of thousands of American soldiers and Vietnamese civilians who
were living, eating and bathing in a virtual omnipresent mist of the rainbow herbicides, the makers of these chemicals were
well aware of their long-term toxic effects, but sought to suppress the information from the government and the public, fearing
negative backlash. Of particular concern to the chemical
companies was Agent Orange, which contained dioxin. Publicly, the chemical companies said dioxin occurred naturally in the
environment and was not harmful to humans. Privately,
they knew otherwise. A February 22, 1965 Dow Chemical
Corporation internal memorandum provided a summary of a meeting in which 13 executives discussed the potential hazards of
dioxin in 2,4,5-T. Following that meeting, Dow officials decided to meet with other makers of the chemical and formulate a
stance on Agent Orange and dioxin. In March 1965,
Dow official V.K. Rowe convened a meeting of executives of Monsanto, Hooker Chemical, which operated the Love Canal dump, Diamond Alkali, the forerunner of Diamond-Shamrock, and the Hercules Powder Co., which later became Hercules,
Inc. According to documents uncovered only years
later, the purpose of this meeting was "to discuss the toxicological problems caused by the presence of certain highly
toxic impurities" in samples of 2,4,5-T. The primary "highly toxic impurity" was 2,3,7,8 TCDD, one of 75 dioxin
CONCERN OVER DIOXINS KEPT
QUIET Three months later, Rowe sent a memo to Ross Mulholland, a manager with Dow in Canada,
informing him that dioxin "is exceptionally toxic, it has a tremendous potential for producing chloracne (a skin disorder
similar to acne) and systemic injury." Rowe ordered Mulholland in a postscript to the letter that "Under no circumstances
may this letter be reproduced, shown or sent to anyone outside of Dow." Among those in attendance at one of the meetings
of chemical company officials was John Frawley, a toxicologist for Hercules, Inc. In an internal memorandum for Hercules officials,
Frawley wrote in 1965 that Dow was concerned the government might learn of a Dow study showing that dioxin caused severe liver
damage in rabbits. Dow was concerned, according to Frawley, that "the whole industry will suffer." Frawley said
he came away from the meeting with the feeling that "Dow was extremely frightened that this situation might explode"
and lead to government restrictions. The concern
over dioxins was kept quiet and largely out of the public view. The U.S. government and the chemical companies presented a
united front on the issue of defoliation, claiming it was militarily necessary to deprive the Viet Cong of hiding places and
food sources and that it caused no adverse economic or health effects to those who came into contact with the rainbow herbicides,
particularly Agent Orange.
AIR FORCE KNEW OF HEALTH
DANGER But, scientists involved
in Operation Ranch Hand and documents uncovered recently in the National Archives present a somewhat different picture. There
are strong indications that not only were military officials aware as early as 1967 of the limited effectiveness of chemical
defoliation, they knew of potential long-term health risks of frequent spraying and sought to keep that information from the
public by managing news reports. Dr. James Clary
was an Air Force scientist in Vietnam who helped write the history of Operation Ranch Hand. Clary says
the Air Force knew Agent Orange was far more hazardous to the health of humans than anyone would admit at the time. "When we (military scientists) initiated the herbicide program
in the 1960s," Clary wrote in a 1988 letter to a member of Congress investigating Agent Orange, "we were aware of
the potential for damage due to dioxin contamination in the herbicide. We were even aware that the `military' formulation
had a higher dioxin concentration than the `civilian' version, due to the lower cost and speed of manufacture. However,
because the material was to be used on the `enemy,' none of us were overly concerned. We never considered a scenario in
which our own personnel would become contaminated with the herbicide. And, if we had, we would have expected our own government
to give assistance to veterans so contaminated."
DOWNPLAYS USE OF HERBICIDES Aware
of the concern over the use of herbicides in Vietnam, particularly the use of Agent Orange, the U.S. Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (MACV), attempted to put the proper public relations spin on information concerning Operation Ranch Hand
by announcing a "revision" in its policy on the use of herbicides. It was not so much a revision of the policy as it was an appearance of a revision of the policy as it
was an appearance of revision, as is evident in a memorandum signed by Gen. R.W. Komer, deputy to Gen. William Westmoreland
for civil operations and RD support (CORDS). "The
purpose of this exercise would be to meet criticisms of excessive use of defoliants by clarifying that they will no longer
be used in large areas, while in reality not restricting our use of defoliants (since they are not now normally used in this
area anyway). In addition, there would be an escape clause . . . which would permit the use of defoliants even in the prohibited
area provided that a strong case could be made to MACV/JGS. "Appearing to restrict the use of defoliants in this manner would (a) help meet US and Vietnamese criticism
of these operations; (b) increase peasant confidence so that they would grow more rice; (c) be of psywar (psychological warfare)
value by suggesting that large areas were sufficiently pacified by now that large scale defoliants use was no longer necessary."
But the idea that the spraying of herbicides could
be confined to a limited area as suggested in this memo was known to be futile as early as 1962.
MIST DRIFT One of the first defoliation efforts of Operation Ranch Hand was near a rubber plantation in January, 1962. According to an unsigned U.S. Army memorandum dated January 24, 1966, titled "Use of Herbicides in Vietnam," studies showed that within
a week of spraying, the trees in the plantation "showed considerable leaf fall." "The injury to the young rubber trees occurred even though the plantation was
located some 500 yards away and upwind of the target at the time of the spray delivery." The memo went on to say that "vapors of the chemical were strong enough in
concentration to cause this injury to the rubber." These vapors, "appear to come from `mist drift' or from vaporization
either in the atmosphere
from `mist drift' or from vaporization either in the
atmosphere or after the spray has settled on the vegetation." The issue of "mist drift" continued to plague the defoliation program. How far would it drift? How fast?
Wind speed and direction were of major concerns in answering these questions. Yet, there were other questions, many of which
could not be answered. What happened in humid weather?
How quickly did the chemicals diffuse in the atmosphere
or were they carried into the clouds and dropped dozens of miles away? How long would the rainbow herbicides linger in the
air or on the ground once they were sprayed? A November 8, 1967 memorandum from Eugene M. Locke, deputy U.S. ambassador in Saigon,
once again addressed the problem of "mist drift" and "significant damage" to rubber plantations from spraying
earlier in the year. According to Locke, "the
herbicide damage resulted from a navigational error; some trees in another plantation had been defoliated deliberately in
order to enhance the security of a U.S. military camp. The bulk of the herbicide damage must be attributed,
however, to the drift of herbicide through the atmosphere. This drift occurs (a) after the spray is released from the aircraft
and before it reaches the ground, and/or (b) when herbicide that has already reached the ground vaporizes during the heat
of the day, is carried aloft, then moved by surface winds and eventually deposited elsewhere. "There is a lack of agreement within the Mission regarding
the distances over which the two kinds of drift can occur. When properly released (as required at 150 feet above the target,
with winds of no more than 10 mph blowing away from nearby plantations) herbicide spray should fall with reasonable accuracy
upon its intended target. The range of drift of vaporized herbicide, however, has not been scientifically established at the
present time. In recognition of this phenomenon and to minimize it, current procedures require that missions may be flown
only during inversion conditions, i.e., when the temperature on the land and in the atmosphere produces downward currents
of air. Estimates within the Mission of vaporized herbicide drift range from only negligible drift
to distances of up to 10 kilometers and more." Ten
kilometers and more. More than six miles. In essence, troops operating more than six miles from defoliation operations could
find themselves, their water and their food doused with chemical agents, including dioxin-laced Agent Orange. And they wouldn't
even know it. More than four months later, on March 23, 1968, Gen. A.R. Brownfield, then Army Chief of Staff, sent a message to all senior U.S. advisors
in the four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) of Vietnam. Brownfield ordered that "helicopter spray operations will not be conducted when ground temperatures are greater
that 85 (degrees) Fahrenheit and wind speed in excess of 10 mph." But the concern was not for any troops operating in the areas of spraying, as was evident in the memo,
but for the rubber plantations. The message ordered that "a buffer distance of at least two (2) kilometers from active
rubber plantation must be maintained." No such considerations were given for the troops operating in the area.
PROJECT PINK ROSE One of the U.S. government's worst
planned and executed efforts to use herbicides was a secret operation known as "Project Pink Rose." According to a recently declassified report on "Project Pink
Rose," the operation had its genesis in September 1965 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff received a recommendation from
the Commander in Chief Pacific "to develop a capability to destroy by fire large areas of forest and jungle growth in
Southeast Asia." On March 11, 1966, a test operation known as "Hot Tip" was documented at Chu Pong mountain near Pleiku when
15 B-52s dropped incendiaries on a defoliated area. According to the declassified memo, "results were inconclusive but
sufficient fire did develop to indicate that this technique might be operationally functional." What neither the government nor the chemical companies told anyone was that burning
dioxins significantly increases the toxicity of the dioxins. So, not only was the government introducing cancer causing chemicals
into the war, it was increasing their toxicity by burning them. Nevertheless, "Project Pink Rose"
continued. In November, 1966, three free strike target areas were selected: one in War Zone D and
two in War Zone C. Each target was a box seven kilometers square. The target areas were double and triple canopy jungle. The
areas were heavily prepped with defoliants, the government dumping 255,000 gallons on the test sites. The three sites were bombed individually, one on January 18, 1967, another January 28, 1967 and the last on April 4, 1967. According to the memo, "the
order and dates of strikes were changed to properly phase Pink Rose operations with concurrent ground operations." Which means that U.S. and Vietnamese troops
were living and fighting in these test sites on which 255,000 gallons of cancer causing defoliants had been dumped. The results of "Project Pink Rose" were less than favorable.
According to the memo, "The Pink Rose technique
is ineffective as a means of removing the forest crown canopy." The conclusion: "Further testing of the Pink Rose technique in South Vietnam under the existing
concept be terminated."
DEFOLIANTS DUMPED ON
PEOPLE In addition to the planned dumps of herbicides, accidental and
intentional dumps of defoliants over populated areas and into the water supplies was not unusual, according to government
documents. A memorandum for the record dated October 31, 1967, and signed by Col. W.T. Moseley, chief of MACV's Chemical Operations Division, reported an emergency
dump of herbicide far from the intended target. At
approximately 1120 hours, October 29, 1967, aircraft #576 made an emergency dump of herbicide in Long Khanh Province due to failure of one engine and loss of power in the other.
Approximately 1,000 gallons of herbicide WHITE were dumped from an altitude of 2,500 feet. No mention was made of wind speed or direction, but chemicals dropped from that
height had the potential to drift a long way. Another
memorandum for the record, this one dated January
8, 1968 and signed by Col. John Moran, chief Chemical
Operations Division of MACV, also reported an emergency dump of herbicide, this time into a major river near Saigon. "At approximately 1015 hours, January 6, 1968, aircraft #633 made an emergency dump over the Dong Nai River approximately 15 kilometers east of Saigon when the aircraft experienced severe engine vibration and loss
of power. Approximately 1,000 gallons of herbicide ORANGE were dumped from an altitude of 3,500 feet."
INTO WATER SUPPLIES
CHEMICAL COMPANY EMPLOYEESThe chemical companies continued to insist that the herbicides
in general, and Agent Orange in particular, had no adverse effects on humans. This despite Dow's concerns about human
exposure to Agent Orange expressed internally in 1965 but hidden from the government. And this despite evidence at the plants
producing Agent Orange that workers exposed to it suffered unusual health problems.
DEVELOP SKIN PROBLEMS
The Diamond Alkali Co. in Newark,
New Jersey, was one of the major producers of Agent Orange for the government. Spurred by Pentagon officials
to make their production schedules to "help the war effort," patriotic employees at Diamond Alkali eagerly sought
to fill their quotas. But some of Diamond Alkali's
employees began suffering what were described as "painful and disfiguring" skin diseases, according to the doctor
who treated more than 50 of the employees in the early and mid 1960s. "They (the employees) were aware of what was going on," said Dr. Roger Brodkin, head of dermatology at
the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey. "No one worried much about the skin disease because everyone was determined to make
production schedules." Brodkin said he alerted
state health officials of the problem, but got little response. "They came out, all of them, said Brodkin. "They looked around and they said, `Ah hah,' and left. Nothing
was done." Brodkin later discovered that many
of Diamond Alkali's employees involved in the manufacture of Agent Orange were suffering a variety of ailments. "We discovered that not only were these people getting skin
disease, but they were also showing some indication of liver damage," he said. It was not until 1983 that the state of New Jersey got around to testing the soil
around the plant. It found hazardous levels of dioxin. New
Jersey Gov. Thomas Kean urged residents living within 300 yards of the plant to move. It was not until 1968 that scientists began raising some concerns about the use of the
rainbow herbicides in Vietnam.
DEPARTMENT EXONERATES Part of their concern came following a November 1967 study by
Yale University botany Professor Arthur Galston. Galston did some experiments with Agent Orange
and other herbicides to determine whether they were dangerous to humans and animals. Galston was unable to come to any definite
conclusions on Agent Orange, but advised that continued use of it might "be harmful" and have unforeseen consequences.
The American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) in the summer of 1968 sent a letter to the Secretaries of State and Defense urging a study to determine the ecological
effects of herbicide spraying in Vietnam. That letter prompted a cable from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.
The cable, dated August 26, 1968, sought additional information but informed embassy officials of the tactic State
was going to take in its reply to the AAAS. "The
Department of State's proposed reply notes that the limited investigations of the ecological problem which have been conducted
by agencies of the USG thus far have failed to reveal serious ecological disturbances, but acknowledges that the long-term
effect of herbicides can be determined definitively only by long-term studies." Rusk suggested releasing "certain non-sensitive" portions of a study on the
ecological effects of herbicide spraying in Vietnam done earlier that year by Dr. Fred H. Tschirley, then assistant chief
of the Corps Protection Research Branch, Corps Research Division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture in Beltsville, Maryland.
Tschirley went to Vietnam under the auspices of the State Department early in 1968 and returned with exactly
the report the U.S. government and the chemical companies wanted. Tschirley foresaw no long-term ecological impact on Vietnam as a
result of the herbicide spraying. In addition, in his report of April 1968, later reprinted in part in the February 21, 1969 issue of Science magazine, Tschirley exonerated the chemical companies. "The herbicides used in Vietnam are only moderately toxic to warm-blooded
animals," Tschirley wrote. "None deserves a lengthy discussion except for Agent Blue (cacodylic acid), which contains
arsenic." This despite evidence within the chemical
companies that dioxin, the most toxic ingredient in Agent Orange, was responsible for health problems in laboratory animals
and workers at the plants that produced the chemical. "There
is no evidence," Tschirley wrote, "to suggest that the herbicides used in Vietnam will cause toxicity
problems for man or animals." Rusk urged Tschirley's
report be made public. In his cable to Saigon, he wrote: "Its publication would not only help avoid some awkwardness
for Tschirley, but would provide us with valuable documentation to demonstrate that the USG is taking a responsible approach
to the herbicide program and that independent investigation has substantiated the Midwest Institute's findings that there
have been no serious adverse ecological consequences." What Rusk did not mention was that Tschirley's report had been heavily edited, in essence changing its findings.
USE OF CHEMICALS CONTINUES IN VIETNAM While the debate over the danger of Agent Orange and dioxin heated up in scientific circles, the U.S. Air Force continued
flying defoliation sorties. And the troops on the ground continued to live in the chemical mist of the rainbow herbicides.
They slept with it, drank it in their water, ate it in their food and breathed it when it dropped out of the air in a fine,
white pungent mist. Some of the troops in Vietnam used the empty Agent Orange drums for barbecue pits. Others stored watermelons and potatoes in them. Still others
rigged the residue laden drums for showers. Former
Marine Danny Gene Jordan remembers sitting on Hill 549 near Khe Sanh in the spring of 1968, waiting for night and cooking
his C-rations. Jordan had been in country just a few weeks and was still learning his way around, so
he wasn't sure why the five C-123s approaching his unit would be flying so low and in formation. "They're defoliating," one of his buddies told him. Then came the mist, like clouds floating out of the back of the C-123s, soaking
the men, their clothes and their food. For the next two weeks, the men of Jordan's unit suffered
nausea and diarrhea. Jordan returned from Vietnam with an unusual amount of dioxin in his system. More than 15
years later, he still had 50 parts per trillion, considered abnormally high. He also had two sons born with deformed arms
and hands. The spraying continued unabated in 1968,
even though, according to military records, it apparently was having minimal effects on the enemy. A series of memorandums
uncovered in the National Archives and now declassified indicate that defoliation killed a lot of plants, but had little real
effect on military operations.
VERSES DISADVANTAGES DISCUSSED As
early as 1967 it had become clear that herbicide spraying was having few of the desired effects. According to an undated and
unsigned USMACV memorandum, Rand Corporation studies in October 1967, concluded "that the crops destruction effort may
well be counterproductive." According to the
memo, "The peasant, who is the target of our long range pacification objectives, bears the brunt of the crop destruction
effort and does not like it." Col. John Moran,
chief of the Chemical Operations Division of MACV, wrote a memorandum dated October 3, 1968, and titled
"Advantages and Disadvantages of the Use of Herbicides in Vietnam" that provides some key insights
into the defoliation program.
"The effect of defoliation on the enemy, in itself,
is of little military value," Moran wrote. "Its military potential is realized only when it is channeled into selected
targets and combined with combat power to restrain the enemy from using an area or pay the cost in men and material from accurately
delivered firepower." Disadvantages of defoliation
were more numerous, according to the memorandum. "The
herbicide program carries with it the potential for causing serious adverse impacts in the economic, social and psychological
fields," Moran wrote. Ecologically, according
to the memorandum, "Semideciduous forests, especially in War Zone C and D, have been severely affected. The regeneration
of these forests could be seriously retarded by repeated applications of herbicide." An unsigned, undated memorandum written sometime late in 1968 provided even more details
about the negative impact of defoliation. Regarding
the effect of VC/NVA combat and infiltration capability, the memo reported that "Very few PWs who have infiltrated even
mention the effects of US herbicide operations. Some state that they have seen areas where the vegetation has been killed,
but do not mention any infiltration problems caused by the defoliation. There are indications that US herbicide operations
have had a negligible effect on NVA infiltration and combat operations." The psychological effects of defoliation, according to the memorandum, were twofold; they either
hardened the resolve of the VC/NVA or angered the Vietnamese farmers whose crops were destroyed. "Some enemy soldiers may become more dedicated to the elimination of those
who `ravage the countryside.' In addition, Allied herbicide operations may provide good material for enemy propaganda
efforts aimed at fermenting an anti-US/GVN (Government of Vietnam) attitude among the population." The
reaction of the civilians affected by herbicide spraying is even more noticeable according to the memo. "The obvious reaction of the peasant whose labors have been destroyed is one
of bitterness and hatred. He will frequently direct this hatred toward both the US/GVN, for accomplishing the destruction,
and the VC/NVA, for bringing it about. If he has previously leaned toward the VC, he is likely to side with them completely
after the crop destruction. He is aided in making this decision by the incessant propaganda of the VC cadre who decry the
`barbarous crimes perpetrated by the Americans and their lackeys.'" So, while Operation Ranch Hand provided no long or short term military benefits, it also provided neither
long nor short term psychological benefits. If anything, it embittered the civilian population of Vietnam
and drove it closer to the Viet Cong and NVA. And no one yet was sure what eventually would be the effect on the health of
those exposed to the chemicals. Operation Ranch Hand was shown by late 1968 to be a bankrupt strategy, one devoid of good
sense, good planning or good intentions.
AEROSOL DISCOVERED Meanwhile,
the military continued to learn just how toxic Agent Orange could be. On October 23, 1969, an urgent
message was sent from Fort Detrick, Maryland, to MACV concerning cleaning of drums containing herbicides.
The message provided detailed instructions on how to clean the drums and warned that it was particularly important to clean
Agent Orange drums. "Using the (Agent) Orange drums for storing petroleum products without thoroughly cleaning of them can result in creation of an orange aerosol
when the contaminated petroleum products are consumed in internal combustion engines. The Orange aerosol
thus generated can be most devastating to vegetation in the vicinity of engines. Some critics claim that some of the damage
to vegetation along Saigon streets can be attributed to this source. White and Blue residues are less of a
problem in this regard since they are not volatile." Not only was Agent Orange being sprayed from aircraft, but it was unwittingly being sprayed out of the exhausts of
trucks, jeeps and gasoline generators. In March 1969,
Lt. Col. Jim Corey, deputy chief of CORDS in I Corps reported to his boss, R.M. Urquhart, unusual defoliation in Da Nang.
"A large number of beautiful shade trees along
the streets in the city of Da Nang are dead or dying," Corey wrote. "This damage appears to be entirely
a result of defoliation chemicals." There was
no evidence of insect or fungus damage to the vegetation, according to the memo. "In every instance of tree and garden plot damage," Corey wrote, "empty defoliant
barrels are either present in the area or have been transported along the route of the damage." The use of herbicides was not confined to the jungles. It was widely used to suppress
vegetation around the perimeters of military bases and, in many instances, the interiors of those bases.
LAB TESTS ON ANIMALS CURTAIL Nevertheless, the use of Agent Orange throughout Vietnam
was widespread through much of 1969. Then, late in the year a study done by Bionetics Research Laboratories showed that dioxin
caused deaths and stillbirths in laboratory animals. The tests revealed that as little as two parts of dioxin per trillion
in the bloodstream was sufficient to cause deaths and abnormal births. And some GIs were returning home from Vietnam with 50 parts per trillion, and more, in their bloodstream. When the report was released by the
Food and Drug Administration, the White House, on October
29, 1969, ordered a partial curtailment of the use
of Agent Orange in Vietnam. On November 4, 1969, a message went out from
Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) and MACV. "A report prepared
for the National Institute of Health presents evidence that 2,4,5-T can cause malformation of offspring and stillbirths in
mice, when given in relatively high doses. This material is present in the defoliant (Agent) Orange.
"Pending decision by the appropriate department on whether this herbicide can remain on
the domestic market, defoliation missions in South
Vietnam using Orange should
be targeted only for areas remote from population. Normal use of White or Blue herbicides can continue, but large scale substitution
of Blue for Orange will not be permitted."
SOME USE OF AGENT ORANGE
USE OF AGENT ORANGE FINALLY ENDED
Despite the order, some troops continued to use Agent Orange when they ran out of the other rainbow
herbicides. Finally, in early 1971, the U.S. Surgeon General prohibited the use of Agent Orange for home use because of possible
harmful effects on humans and on June 30, 1971, all United States defoliation operations in
Vietnam were brought to an end.
BEGIN DEVELOPING HEALTH PROBLEMS
As soldiers who had served in Vietnam
attempted to settle back into civilian life following their tours, some of them began to develop unusual health problems.
There were skin and liver diseases and what seemed to be an abnormal number of cancers to soft tissue organs such as the lungs
and stomach. There also seemed to be an unusually high number of birth defects among children born to Vietnam
veterans who had been exposed to Agent Orange. Some veterans experienced wild mood swings, while others developed a painful
skin rash known as chloracne. Many of these veterans were found to have high levels of dioxin in their blood, but scientists
and the U.S. government insisted there was no link between their illnesses and Agent Orange. In the mid 1970s, there was renewed interest in dioxin and its
effects on human health following an industrial accident in Seveso, Italy, in which dioxin was released into the air, causing
animal deaths and human sickness.
USE OF AGENT ORANGE IN U.S. Then, in 1979, the Environmental Protection Agency banned the
use of Agent Orange in the United States when a large number of stillbirths were reported among mothers
in Oregon, where the chemical had been heavily used. While veterans clamored for help from the Veterans Administration, the government responded either slowly,
or not at all. In 1979, a National Veterans Task Force on Agent Orange was formed and legislation finally was passed by Congress
at the urging of Rep. Tom Daschle (D-SD), a Vietnam veteran who became a U.S. Senator, to commission a large scale
epidemiological study of veterans who had been exposed to the herbicide. That proved to be only the beginning of the battle over Agent Orange. Over the next four years, the VA examined an estimated 200,000 veterans for medical
problems they claimed stemmed from Agent Orange and other herbicides used in Vietnam. But many of those
examined were dissatisfied with their examinations. They claimed the exams were done poorly and often in haste by unqualified
medical personnel. Many veterans also claimed that the VA seemed to have a mind set to ignore or debunk Agent Orange connected
disability complaints. CLASS ACTION SUIT FILED Fed up with what they perceived as government inaction on the
Agent Orange issue, veterans filed a class action lawsuit in 1982 against the chemical companies that had made Agent Orange. Among the companies named were Dow Chemical Co. of Midland, Michigan; Monsanto Co. of St.
Louis, Missouri; Diamond Shamrock Corp. of Dallas, Texas; Hercules
Inc. of Wilmington, Delaware; Uniroyal Inc. of Middlebury, Connecticut; Thompson Chemical Corp. of Newark, New Jersey and the T.H. Agriculture and
Nutrition Co. of Kansas City, Missouri. By the early 1980s, some of the chemical companies' dirty little secrets about dioxin were beginning to leak
TIMES BEACH Times Beach was an idyllic little community of about 2,200 residents
in the rolling farmlands of eastern Missouri 20 miles southwest of St. Louis. It was an
ideal place to live and raise children, with plenty of open spaces, two story wood frame houses, quiet streets and none of
the pollution, poverty or crime of the inner city. Or
so it seemed. Unknown to the residents of Times Beach, for several years in the mid 1970s, dioxin laced oil had been sprayed on the town's
roads to keep down the dust. Times Beach was one of 28 eastern Missouri communities where the spraying
had been done. But none of the others had the levels of dioxin contamination of Times Beach,
parts of which had dioxin levels of 33,000 parts per billion, or 33,000 times more toxic than the EPA's level of acceptance.
The contamination was so bad that the government
decided the only way to save the town's residents from further damage from dioxin was to buy them out and move them out.
In early 1983, the U.S. government
spent $33 million buying the 801 homes and businesses in Times Beach and relocating its 2,200 residents.
The entire town was fenced in and guards were brought in to keep out the curious. "Caution, Hazardous Waste Site, Dioxin
Contamination," read the signs leading into Times Beach. What had been a comfortable little community became a ghost town. It remains a ghost town
today because of dioxin contamination. So, while
the government was paying off the residents of Times Beach because of dioxin contamination, it
continued to deny that Vietnam veterans who had been exposed to Agent Orange and its dioxin were at risk.
AMA DOWNPLAYS DIOXIN DANGER While the government was busily buying up Times Beach and evacuating its residents, the American Medical Association was coming under attack from environmental health
specialists for its stance on dioxin. In its June 1983 convention, the AMA adopted a resolution calling for a public information
campaign on dioxin to "prevent irrational reaction and unjustified public fright." "The news media have made dioxin the focus of a witch hunt by disseminating
rumors, hearsay and unconfirmed, unscientific reports," the resolution read, in part. That position was overwhelmingly supported by President Ronald Reagan in a speech
at the AMA convention, calling the resolution "a positive step toward a more reasonable public debate" on the issue.
But Dr. Samuel Epstein, professor of occupational
and environmental medicine at the University of Illinois Medical Center in Chicago, called the AMA "incompetent
and ignorant" for its stance on dioxin. "The
AMA's contribution in this area is a profound disservice and consistent with their established record of extreme conservatism
and lack of information and demonstrated lack of concern for preventive medicine," said Epstein. And Dr. Paul Wiesner, an assistant director of the CDC said that "Evidence
is increasing that there is an association with a rare form of tumor called soft tissue sarcoma after occupational exposure
AND CONFUSING By 1983, the results
of studies of Agent Orange and dioxin exposure began to trickle in. They were, for the most part, contradictory and confusing.
A series of studies conducted between 1974 and 1983 by Dr. Lennart Hardell, the so called Swedish studies, showed a link between
exposure to Agent Orange and soft tissue sarcomas and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. And in July 1983, the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) released a report citing "an association" between dioxin exposure and incidence of soft
tissue sarcoma. "The early warning sign has
gone up," said Dr. Edward Brandt, Jr., assistant secretary of the HHS. This was also the year of the Times Beach buy out and growing nationwide concern
over dioxin. Few people knew what it was and only Vietnam veterans and researchers knew what it could do to the human body.
In December 1983, the EPA announced a nationwide
plan to clean up more than 200 dioxin contaminated sites, including 50 plants where 2,4,5-T had been manufactured. The cost
of the cleanup was put at $250 million and was expected to take four years. But barely two months later, in February, 1984, the U.S. Air Force released the fi
But barely two months later, in February, 1984, the U.S.
Air Force released the first part of a three part study on Operation Ranch Hand pilots and crewmen. It concluded that the
1,269 pilots and crewmen involved in the herbicide spraying program in Vietnam suffered no higher
death or serious illness rates than the general population. But to Vietnam veterans, studying aircrews who had handled drums of Agent Orange, and not the
soldiers exposed to it, was like testing the crew of the Enola Gay for the effects of radiation, not the survivors of Hiroshima. Said Maj. Gen. Murphy Chesney, deputy
Air Force Surgeon General: "Do I worry as a physician because we used it? The answer is no. I say war is hell, you've
got to win it. Agent Orange was a war agent. It was used to protect our ground troops. It saved millions of lives possibly,
thousands, anyway, in Vietnam." MACV
memorandums written during the war did not support Chesney's claims that Agent Orange saved lives, but no one questioned
him on his conclusions because those documents were still classified. The VA, meanwhile, continued to dismiss veterans health complaints if they dealt with exposure to Agent Orange. "A lot of veterans are scared because of early news reports
of physical damage, while some among any large number of people are going to have health problems such as a matter of routine
natural incidence," said Dr. Barclay Shepard, director of Agent Orange Studies for the VA. "Put that together with
disillusionment over the Vietnam War and anger with the government and there is little wonder that many veterans truly believe
that they have in some way been hurt. But the evidence has not supported a cause and effect relationship."
LAWSUIT SETTLED - VETS WIN, BUT LOSE Then
on May 7, 1984, came the news that the Agent Orange lawsuit, filed two years earlier, had been settled.
Prodded by U.S. District Judge Jack B. Weinstein, attorneys for the veterans and the chemical companies reached an agreement
at 4 a.m. the morning the case was to go to trial. At that time, 15,000 veterans and their relatives were
involved in the suit, but about 250,000 subsequently filed claims. Under the terms of the settlement, the Vietnam veterans who claimed exposure to Agent Orange would receive $180
million from the chemical companies. But those companies did not have to accept blame for any injuries that occurred as a
result of Agent Orange. The U.S. government was not a party to the litigation. "Thus resolution is a compassionate, expedient and productive means of meeting the
needs of the people involved," said David Buzzelli, vice president of government and public affairs for Dow Chemical.
Veterans at first were ecstatic. "This is a defeat for the chemical companies. We brought them down to their
knees and we got an open admission of guilt," said Rod Rinker of Atlanta, one of the veterans who claimed Agent Orange
exposure. Not so, said the chemical companies. "When you look at the overwhelming scientific evidence, Agent
Orange is not a reasonable or likely cause of the ill health effects experienced by the veterans," said R.W. Charlton,
another Dow spokesman. Despite the release earlier
of the results of the Operation Ranch Hand study, 1984 seemed to be a year in which the Vietnam veteran's
complaints about Agent Orange and the health problems it caused were being taken seriously. The federal court decision boosted
the morale of the Agent Orange claimants. Then Congress chimed in. In late 1984, Congress passed Public Law 98-542, designed to provide compensation for soft tissue sarcoma and required
the VA to establish standards for general Agent Orange and atomic radiation compensation. It seemed as if the veterans were winning. But every time a veteran went to the VA seeking
compensation for Agent Orange related problems, he was turned away. "Since 1984, Public Law 98-542 has been virtually ignored," said South Dakota Sen. Tom Daschle. "In
spite of the intent of Congress, in spite of the efforts of everyone involved in the writing of that law, in spite of our
promises to veterans at that time that at long last, after all these years, they would be given the benefit of the doubt,
not one veteran in this country has been compensated for any disease other than chloracne." Agent Orange sufferers tried on several occasions to sue the government for its
role in use of the herbicide, but their suits were routinely dismissed because of what has come to be known as the Feres Doctrine.
In 1950, the Supreme Court ruled in a case involving the death of a military man that the government is not responsible for
deaths, injuries or other losses related to military service. Meanwhile, the reality of the settlement reached in the lawsuit with the seven chemical companies began to settle
in. The lawyers involved wanted $40 million off the top for their fees. They had decided in a secret agreement prior to the
May 1984 settlement that they would receive a 300 percent return on any investment in time and effort they had made. Many
veterans charged that this secret fee agreement by the plaintiff's management committee precluded any incentive for the
committee to represent the veterans in the suit. Judge Weinstein decided to give the lawyers $9.2 million. It became readily apparent that $180 million just wasn't enough to take care
of the Agent Orange claimants and their families, which had reached more than 200,000 by then. A master plan to divide the
settlement noted that the settlement "is simply not large enough." The plan suggested taking $130 million for a
settlement to provide cash payments to eligible veterans or the families of deceased members. Maximum cash payments of $12,800
to the most qualified claimants, or about 17,000 veterans and their survivors, was suggested. The master plan also suggested
using $52 million to fund a "class assistance foundation" earmarked for benefit programs.
TEST RESULTS CONTINUE TO BE MIXED Results of Agent Orange tests continued to be mixed. The results varied greatly,
depending on who was doing the testing. In December,
1985, the Air Force released the third of its Operation Ranch Hand studies. It confirmed the other two: that there was no
evidence that Agent Orange had any adverse affects on those who handled it during the war. "At this time, there is no evidence of increased mortality as a result of herbicide
exposure among individuals who performed the Ranch Hand spray operation in Southeast Asia," the Air
Force concluded. But in April, 1986, the CDC released
a report that showed that the residents of a mobile home park near St. Louis were suffering from liver and
immune system damage as a result of their exposure to dioxin laced chemicals. According to the study, the 154 residents of Quail Run Mobile Home Park in Gray Summit, Missouri, near Times Beach southwest of St. Louis, showed depressed liver function and deficiencies in their immune systems. The
dirt roads in the mobile home park had been sprayed in 1971 with dioxin laced oil to keep down the dust. While the CDC seemed concerned about Missouri residents exposed
to dioxin laced chemicals, it did not demonstrate the same concern for Vietnam veterans exposed to
dioxin contaminated herbicides. In fact, information began to surface in 1986 that the CDC not only was dragging its feet
on Agent Orange studies, it was deliberately ignoring information to which it had access in order to come up with results
that would be favorable to the government. In the
summer of 1986, the House Veterans Affairs Subcommittee on Hospitals and Health Care held hearings to assess the progress
of the CDC study of Agent Orange, mandated seven years earlier. Testimony from witnesses from the Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) shocked and angered members of the committee, according to Sen. Tom Daschle. "OTA reported that the Centers for Disease Control had changed the protocol for the study
without authorization," said Daschle. "OTA also reported at that particular hearing that petty arguments at CDC
were interfering with the study's progress and that progress had virtually come to a standstill." After seven years of study, the CDC had made no progress on one of the most important
and highly publicized issues of the war in Vietnam.
In charge of the CDC study was Dr. Vernon Houk, director
of the agency's Center for Environmental Health and Injury Control. The White House's Agent Orange Working Group was
supposed to supervise the CDC study while the Pentagon's Environmental Support Group was charged with providing the CDC
with records of Agent Orange spraying and troop deployment. Houk's CDC team complained throughout the study that those records were too spotty to make a scientific study
of the effects of Agent Orange on soldiers. Not so,
said the Pentagon. Richard Christian, head of the Pentagon's Environmental Support Group, testified before Congress in
mid 1986 that the records of troop movements and spraying were more than adequate for a scientific study. Christian's testimony was bolstered by two other sources. Retired Army Maj.
Gen. John Murray had been asked by Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger in early 1986 to undertake a study to determine if
Pentagon records were adequate for purposes of the study. After four months, Murray also determined that
the records for a comprehensive study of Agent Orange were more than adequate. In addition, the Institute of Medicine, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, had used
outside consultants to study reports of troop deployment and Agent Orange spraying to determine if they were sufficient for
CDC purposes. Its conclusion: the Pentagon had the necessary records. The Institute of Medicine
also was highly critical of the CDC research methods, charging that it excluded from its study the veterans most likely to
have been exposed to Agent Orange.
HOUSE COVER-UP Despite
information from three sources that there were adequate records available for a comprehen sive CDC study on Agent Orange,
the White House and CDC sought to cover it up. First,
the Institute of Medicine's study was never turned over to the White House. Then, Murray decided that as a non-scientist, he was in no position to challenge the objections of CDC's Houk and deferred
to his judgement on the matter of records. Then, according to Daschle, the Pentagon came down hard on Christian for criticizing
the CDC. "DOD officials altered his follow-up
testimony before it was sent to the Hill, deleting his information challenging CDC's claims," said Daschle. By mid 1986, the White House had set the wheels in motion to cancel
the CDC's Agent Orange study. There were other
indications that the Reagan administration had no real interest in studies of Agent Orange or dioxin. In late 1986, the House
Energy and Commerce Committee learned that the White House's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was trying to stop
all dioxin research, claiming that enough research had been done. Despite efforts to shut down research and cover up results of studies not favorable to the government or chemical
companies, evidence continued to flow in showing a definite statistical link between cancers and exposure to Agent Orange
and dioxin: - A 1986 study by the National Cancer
Institute of Kansas revealed that farmers exposed to 2,4-D, an ingredient of Agent Orange, had six times more non-Hodgkin's
lymphomas than farmers not exposed. - A VA study
released in 1987 showed that Marines who served in areas of Vietnam that had been heavily sprayed with
Agent Orange had a 110 percent higher rate of non-Hodgkin's lymphomas. The study also showed these Marines had a 58 percent
higher rate of lung cancers. - A 1987 study in the
state of Washington showed veterans who had been exposed to Agent Orange had significant increases
in soft tissue sarcomas and non-Hodgkin's lymphomas. -
A 1987 VA study showed veterans who were most likely exposed to Agent Orange had eight times more soft tissue sarcoma than
other veterans. Meanwhile, the CDC had been taking
blood samples of 646 Vietnam veterans, selected on the basis of probable exposure to Agent Orange, to test the
level of dioxin in their blood. Other scientists were highly critical of this method of testing, but the CDC moved on. Then, in September 1987, the CDC exonerated Agent Orange, claiming
once again there were not sufficient records available to make the necessary tests. "We cannot find a sufficiently large number of people who have been exposed to do a scientifically
valid study of exposure to Agent Orange," said Houk. "We looked at three different kinds of exposure: short-term, long-term and exposure from being in an area of
Vietnam where the herbicide was used. In none of these groups was there any difference in the level
of Agent Orange in the blood." Houk recommended
that the Agent Orange study be canceled. The White House agreed, and shortly after that the CDC's $43 million Agent Orange
study came to an end with a not guilty verdict for Agent Orange.
STUDY CALLED A FRAUD But again, there was more information available that was never presented. The Institute of
Medicine in the weeks before the CDC released its results of blood tests wrote a stinging rebuke of the
CDC's tests methods. It said that none of the CDC's conclusions was supported by scientific data. The CDC refused
to turn this report over to the White House. "Either
it was a politically rigged operation or it was a monumentally bungled operation," said Rep. Ted Weiss (D-NY), chairman
of the Government Operations Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee. Other information began turning up that there were concerted efforts by various
agencies of the government to conceal records and information about the effects of Agent Orange. Daschle learned that there were major discrepancies between a January 1984 draft
of the Air Force's Operation Ranch Hand study and the February 1984 report. According to Daschle, the draft showed there
were twice as many birth defects among the children of Ranch Hand participants. "The draft also reported that the Ranch
Handers were less well than the controls by a ratio of 5 to 1," said Daschle. But these results were deleted from the final Ranch Hand report, which said there had been no
adverse effects from exposure to Agent Orange. "The
Air Force deleted these findings from the final report at the suggestion of a Ranch Hand Advisory Committee set up by the
White House Agent Orange Working Group," said Daschle. Air Force scientists involved in the study said they were pressured by non-scientists within the Air Force and the
White House to change the results and delete critical information for the final report. Daschle says he has even obtained
two versions of the minutes of the meeting in which that pressure was applied. One confirms what the scientists told him.
Another set deletes that information. "What
happened there was a fraud perpetrated by people whose names we still do not know," said Daschle. Part of the fraud appears to have been perpetrated by the Monsanto Corp., which
produces a number of chemicals containing dioxin. Monsanto knowingly rigged test results of employees who had been exposed
to dioxin to make the effects of it appear far less than it actually was, according to a February 23, 1990 Environmental Protection
Agency memorandum. The memorandum was written by
Dr. Cate Jenkins, a chemist in the Waste Characterization Branch, Characterization and Assessment Division of the EPA to Dr.
Raymond C. Loehr, chairman of EPA's Science Advisory Board Executive Committee. Jenkins writes that a key epidemiological study leading to the conclusion that there was no definitive
data on human health effects of dioxins was based on examination of medical records of Monsanto employees from a 1949 explosion.
That study "found no statistically significant excess cancer deaths," according to Jenkins. "This study by Monsanto apparently has now been shown to be a fraud,"
"This study on behalf of Monsanto is described, where
it is alleged that the record demonstrated a deliberate course of conduct by Monsanto through `altered' research to prove
to the world that the only health consequences of dioxins was the relatively harmless, reversible condition of chloracne."
Since this study was altered, Jenkins surmises, "It
could be that other studies on exposed populations are similarly flawed and subject to fraud." The study in question
was done of employees at a Nitro, West Virginia Monsanto plant following an explosion in 1949 in which a number of them were
exposed to dioxins. The study, performed by two Monsanto employees, concluded that the death rate of exposed workers was the
same as the death rate of unexposed workers. However, later investigation revealed that the authors of the
study omitted five deaths from the exposed group and took four workers who had been exposed and put them in the unexposed
group. This decreased the death rate in the exposed group and increased the death rate in the unexposed group. The exposed
group actually had 18 cancer deaths as a result of the exposure, not the nine deaths reported in the study. And there were
a total of 28 cancers in the exposed group, compared to only two cancers in the unexposed group. This type fraud appears to have been perpetrated regularly in connection with Agent
Orange research, yet Congress continues to rely on this flawed research when it considers legislation that would benefit the
victims of Agent Orange and the other rainbow herbicides.
MONTGOMERY HOLDS UP AGENT Efforts to get comprehensive Agent Orange legislation
through Congress to right the wrongs of the cover-ups have been unsuccessful largely through the efforts of one man: Rep.
Sonny Montgomery of Mississippi, chairman of the House Veterans Affairs Committee, who claimed to be the friend
and champion of veterans in Congress - in fact had virtually single-handedly bottled up Agent Orange legislation. The CDC, meanwhile, continues to perpetrate the scientifically
flawed myth that Agent Orange and dioxin posed no health threats to Vietnam veterans. In a study released March 29, 1990, the CDC admitted that Vietnam veterans face a higher risk of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, but denied that it was a result of exposure to Agent
Orange. It said the studies showed that Vietnam veterans do not have higher rats of soft tissue sarcomas, Hodgkin's
disease, nasal cancer, nasopharyngeal cancer and liver cancer.
BIZARRE FINDING One
of the more bizarre aspects of this report from the CDC was the claim that those veterans who suffered most from non-Hodgkin's
lymphoma had served on Navy ships off the coast of Vietnam. It said that those who had served in III Corps, which had some
of the heaviest Agent Orange spraying of the war, seemed to be at lower risk. "There is no risk in this study associated with (dioxin) exposure," said Dr. Daniel
Hoffman of the CDC. Veterans groups were appalled by the findings. "The conclusion seems to fly in the face of other scientific studies, which indicates there is a connection
between Agent Orange and cancer, birth defects and other disorders. It makes it sound like Agent Orange is like orange juice,
healthy for you instead of harmful," said John Hanson, a spokesman for the American Legion.
HOUSE COMMITTEE SAYS STUDY FLAWED The House Committee in its August 1990 report also found that the 1987 Agent Orange
study canceled by CDC was done so at the behest of the White House. Its report was a stinging rebuke to the White House and
the CDC. The report offered these conclusions: "A.
The CDC Agent Orange exposure study should not have been canceled because it did not document that exposure of veterans to
the herbicide could not be assessed, nor did CDC explore alternative methods of determining the exposure. "B. The original protocol for the CDC Agent Orange study was changed to the
point that it was unlikely for the heaviest exposed soldiers to be identified. "C. The blood serum analysis, which was used as proof by CDC that an Agent Orange exposure
study could not be conducted, was based on erroneous assumptions and a flawed analysis. "D. The White House compromised the independence of the CDC and undermined the study
by controlling crucial decisions and guiding the course of research at the same time it had secretly taken a legal position
to resist demands to compensate victims of Agent Orange exposure and industrial accidents. "E. The Federal Government has suppressed or minimized findings of ill health
effects among Vietnam veterans that could be linked to Agent Orange exposure." An indepth reading of the report reveals even more sordid details of how the CDC
and the White House stacked the deck on Agent Orange. According
to the report, "The CDC study was changed from its original format so that it would have been unlikely for the soldiers
who received the heaviest exposure to the herbicide to be identified. CDC accomplished this by unjustifiably discrediting
the military records provided to it by the Department of Defense's Environmental Study Group (ESG)."
POLITICS AND MONEY MORE The rebuke of the White House and its Agent Orange Working Group
(AOWG) was even more revealing of the manner in which Agent Orange studies have been manipulated by political and economic
concerns, not concerns about human lives. "The
original mandate to focus the White House panel on the effects of all herbicides was abruptly altered by the Reagan White
House," according to the report. "By focusing the work of AOWG on Agent Orange only, the administration laid the
groundwork for manipulating the study to the point of uselessness. "A possible reason that the White House chose this path is revealed in confidential documents prepared by attorneys
in OMB. The White House was deeply concerned that the Federal Government would be placed in the position of paying compensation
to veterans suffering diseases related to Agent Orange and, moreover, feared that providing help to Vietnam veterans would
set the precedent of having the U.S. compensate civilian victims of toxic contaminant exposure, too."
IMPORTANT THAN HUMAN LIVES
SOME DEFY CDC STUDY
Despite the CDC's continuing recalcitrance on the issue of Agent Orange exposure, there have
been other, more enlightened voices heard. Secretary
of Veterans Affairs Edward Derwinski is one of them. After hearing of the CDC's latest study, he ordered the VA to pay
compensation to all veterans suffering from non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, a ruling which could mean as much as $23 million to
the 1,600 non-Hodgkin's lymphoma sufferers or their widows and children. Derwinski also decided not to challenge a California court's finding that the
VA was applying too strict a standard to determine whether Agent Orange harmed Vietnam veterans. Derwinski
ordered the VA to abide by legislation passed in 1984 to give veterans the benefit of the doubt on health claims. "Overall, we're doing things a lot different here now,"
said Derwinski. "We're making decisions without sweeping things under the rug. We're not procrastinating. We're
also shaking up a few people and sweeping away a few cobwebs." Another of the more enlightened voices is that of retired Adm. Elmo Zumwalt Jr.
Another of the more enlightened voices is that of retired
Adm. Elmo Zumwalt Jr., who ordered certain areas of Vietnam to be sprayed with Agent Orange. Zumwalt's son, Elmo Zumwalt III, served in the Navy in Vietnam
and was exposed to the herbicide. Elmo Zumwalt III died in 1988 at the age of 42 from Hodgkin's diseases and lymphoma.
Father and son believed that exposure to Agent Orange caused the cancers. "I definitely believe my son would have had an additional 20 years of life had we not used it,"
said the elder Zumwalt. Adm. Zumwalt has become a
crusader on the issue of Agent Orange, charging that the government "intentionally manipulated or withheld compelling
information on the adverse health effects" associated with exposure to Agent Orange. "The flawed scientific studies and manipulated conclusions are not only unduly denying
justice to Vietnam veterans suffering from exposure to Agent Orange," said Zumwalt, "they are now standing in the
way of a full disclosure to the American people of the likely health effects of exposure to toxic dioxins." Daschle is another of the enlightened voices, calling not only
for true, scientific studies of Agent Orange free from political interference, but investigations of the cover-ups by the
White House and the CDC that enabled them to perpetrate the myth that Agent Orange is not harmful to human health. "Can you blame veterans for wondering what is going on?"
asked Daschle. "Can you blame their families who continue to watch all of this unfold, and not share their sense of frustration,
their sense of indignation at the conflicting comments, the duplicity, the obfuscation that occurs time and time again when
government officials at the highest level are being called upon to inform the public, but they cover up information instead?"
GOVERNMENT PLAYS WAITING GAME But as the government continues to
drag its feet, more veterans and their children continue to suffer the effects of Agent Orange. Time is on the side of the government. The longer it waits, the longer it procrastinates,
the more the problems of Agent Orange exposure is diminished by the deaths of those who suffered from exposure to it. Their
names could be added to the black granite wall of the Vietnam memorial, casualties of the rainbow herbicides that followed
them home from the war.
RAINBOW HERBICIDES AND
THEIR COMPONENTS: - Agent
Orange: 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T; used between January 1965 and April 1970.
- Agent Orange II (Super Orange): 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T;
used in 1968 and 1969.
- Agent Purple: 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T; used between January 1962 and 1964.
- Agent Pink: 2,4,5-T;
used between 1962 and 1964.
- Agent Green: 2,4,5-T; used between 1962 and 1964.
- Agent White: Picloram and 2,4-D.
- Agent Blue: contained cacodylic acid (arsenic).
- Dinoxol: 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T; used between 1962 and 1964.
- Trinoxol: 2,4,5-T; used between 1962 and 1964.
- Diquat: Used between 1962 and 1964.
- Bromacil: Used between
1962 and 1964.
- Tandex: Used between 1962 and 1964.
- Monuron: Used between 1962 and 1964.
- Diuron: Used
between 1962 and 1964.
- Dalapon: Used between 1962 and 1964.
The Legacy Continues
By Betty Mekdeci
January 18, 2008
The soldiers are dying. But, even more tragically, the children they have left behind are suffering. Sometimes
at Birth Defect Research for Children we hear from veterans, but usually it is wives and children who send us poignant messages:“I lost my husband from a cancerous brain tumor 13 months
ago. My son has many disabilities, including Tourette’s syndrome, mental retardation, mild cerebral palsy, hydrocephalus,
and he is profoundly deaf. He will never be able to live on his own.”“My father passed away in 1998. He had many health problems, including type
II diabetes. He was only 50 years old. Agent Orange has been a part of my life from the moment I was born. I was born without
my right leg, several of my fingers, and my big toe on my left foot. My mother had three miscarriages. My younger brother
(age 29) has to wear bifocals and suffers from chronic joint pain.”“I served four tours in Vietnam.
We have three children: one daughter with a heart defect, another with scoliosis and digestive problems, and a son born with
a defective optic nerve that has left him blind in the right eye. There is no history of birth defects on either side of our
family.”Since 1991, we have
recorded thousands of such cases in our National Birth Defect Registry.Some 2.8 million Americans served in the Vietnam theater of operations. Three-to-six percent of Vietnam veterans’
children are born with some kind of birth defect (Emory University School of Medicine reports a 3-4 percent birth-defect rate among the
general population). An impressive body of scientific evidence points to increases in birth defects and developmental problems
in the children of Vietnam veterans and others exposed to dioxin-like chemicals.Agent Orange was a combination of two defoliants, 2,4,5-T and
2,4-D contaminated by dioxin (TCDD), a toxic byproduct of the chemical production process. More than 19 million gallons of
herbicides were sprayed in Vietnam between 1962-71. More than 11.2 million gallons sprayed after
1965 were dioxin-contaminated Agent Orange. Agents Purple, Pink, and Green used before 1965 were even more highly contaminated
with dioxin.According to Barry Commoner
and Thomas Webster in their 2003 book Dioxins and Health, “the current scientific evidence argues not only that dioxin
is a potent carcinogen, but that the non-cancer health and environmental hazards of dioxin may be more serious than believed
previously.” They report that dioxin appears to act like a persistent synthetic hormone that interferes with important
physiological signaling systems that can lead to altered cell development, differentiation, and regulation. The most troubling
consequence is the possibility of reproductive, developmental, and immunological effects at the levels of dioxin-like compounds
present in the bodies of the average person.Since studies of Vietnam veterans exposed to herbicides in Vietnam have found much higher levels of dioxin in their bodies than the average person, these effects
also should be detectable in their children.In 1996, the National Academy
of Sciences found “limited/suggestive” evidence of an association between Agent Orange exposure and spina bifida,
a neural tube defect, in the children of Vietnam veterans. In 2000,
Dr. H.K. Kang of the Environmental Epidemiology Service of the Veterans Health Administration published a study that found
that the risk of moderate-to-severe birth defects was significantly associated with the mother’s military service in
Vietnam. As a result of these findings, the VA now funds assistance programs
for spina bifida in the children of male or female Vietnam veterans and for
all birth defects without other known causes in the children of female veterans.The Australian Department of Veterans Affairs (without acknowledging a link to Agent
Orange exposure) provides treatment to the children of Vietnam veterans
with spina bifida, cleft lip or palate, acute myeloid leukemia, and adrenal gland cancer.Other studies offer evidence that many more birth defects may be associated with
dioxin-contaminated herbicide exposure in Vietnam. In 1990, an independent
scientific review of the literature was sponsored by Vietnam Veterans
of America, the American Legion, and the National Veterans Legal Services
Project. Seven prominent, independent scientists and physicians on this Agent Orange Scientific Task Force concluded that
elevated incidences of birth defects in the children of Vietnam veterans
were found in several studies. These included spina bifida, oral clefts, cardiovascular defects, hip dislocations, and malformations
of the urinary tract. In addition, defects of the digestive tract and other neoplasms such as neuroblastoma also were higher
in Vietnam veterans’ children.
Aschengrau and Monson of the Harvard School of Public Health conducted
a study published in 1990 in the American Journal of Public Health on paternal military service and
problems including thyroid disorders and childhood diabetes. More and more studies of prenatal exposures to dioxins and similar
chemicals are adding support for these associations.According to Linda Birnbaum of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, dioxin can modulate growth and
development. In the embryo and fetus, dioxin-altered programming can result in malformations, anomalies, fetal toxicity, and
functional and structural deficits that often are not detectable until later in life.In a paper published in Environmental Health Perspectives, Birnbaum discusses
research that demonstrates that prenatal exposures to endocrine disruptors (chemicals that can disrupt hormone activity) such
as TCDD can alter hormones, reproductive tissue development, and increase susceptibility to potential carcinogen exposure
in the adult.Increased susceptibility
to chronic childhood infections and cancers later in life may be a result of dioxin’s effects on the developing immune
system. Researchers in 2000 investigated the immunological effects of everyday exposures to PCBs and dioxins in preschool-age
Dutch children. The researchers found that prenatal exposure to these chemicals was associated with changes in the T-cell
population. They concluded that the effects of prenatal background exposure to PCBs and dioxins persist into childhood and
could be associated with a greater susceptibility to infectious disease.Another 2003 study by a team of researchers from Quebec reported
their finding of a chemical imbalance that could be a marker for prenatal immune damage caused by organochlorines (which include
dioxin-like compounds). The researchers found that the lymphocyte cells of newborns exposed to higher concentrations of these
chemicals during prenatal development secreted fewer cytokines than those of a control group of newborns. These alterations
of the immune system could lead to increased susceptibility to infection.A growing body of evidence is linking prenatal exposures to dioxin-like chemicals to
learning and behavioral deficits. At a Children’s Health Meeting
in 2000 sponsored by the National Institute of
Environmental Health Sciences, Jerry Heindel reported on several studies of pregnant women who had consumed several meals
of PCB-contaminated fish per month during pregnancy and who gave birth to infants with small but detectable learning and behavioral
deficits. The children with the highest exposure averaged six points lower in IQ compared to children with lower levels of
exposure.A 2007 study from the Department
of Preventive Medicine at Kyungpook University in South Korea reported associations between
blood concentration of persistent organic pollutants (including dioxins) and increases in learning and attention disorders
in children in the general population.Thomas
Zoeller, an endocrinologist at the University of Massachusetts, has found that dioxin-like PCBs activate cellular machinery
that can alter the structure of other, non-dioxin-like PCBs. Some of these dioxin-induced metabolites can act directly on
the thyroid hormone receptor. In the fetal brain, this could alter the course of development leading to learning and developmental
disabilities.The new research on
dioxin and dioxin-like chemicals holds the promise of unraveling the intricate ways in which these chemicals can alter embryonic
development. The research should continue, but it is now 35 years since Agent Orange was first sprayed in Vietnam.
And the calls keep coming.In Dioxins
and Health, Thomas Webster and Barry Commoner comment: “Much of the media coverage of the dioxin debate has consisted
of trying to convince the public that their common sense is wrong and that experts know best. In this case, the public’s
view has been largely correct. Dioxin is a dangerous and unwanted chemical pollutant.”Vietnam veterans who would like to add information about their children’s birth defects or disabilities to the National
Birth Defect Registry sponsored by Birth Defect Research for Children can register online at www.birthdefects.orgBetty Mekdeci is the executive
director of Birth Defect Research for Children.
HELP FOR CHILDREN
Starting October 1, 1997, the VA will pay compensation and offer free medical care and vocational rehabilitation
to Vietnam vets children with Spina Bifida.
The VA also offers assistance
to children of veterans if the veterans have been rated at least 30 percent service-connected disabled. Such veterans receive
a dependents’ allowance. In addition to monetary allowances, vocational training and rehabilitation, the Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA) also provides VA-financed healthcare benefits to women Vietnam veterans' birth children diagnosed with certain birth defects. For specifics go to http://www.va.gov/hac/cwvv/cwvv.htm
Children with disabilities may be eligible for Supplemental
Security Income benefits. One of the Agent Orange-funded programs offers a16-page booklet discussing children’s eligibility
for SSI (“SSI: New Opportunities for Children with Disabilities”). Contact:
Mental Health Law Project
1101 15th St., NW,
Washington, DC 20005
The Agent Orange Program provided funding for a program
for families with children with birth defects or other special health needs. The Center for Developmental Disabilities at
the University of South Carolina offers a National Information Service which consists of telephone access to trained counselors,
to provide information and referral services for parents of children with disabilities, including information and referrals
concerning genetic counseling. Contact:
1-800-922-9234, ext. 401
1-800-922-1107, ext. 401 (in South Carolina)
of Agent Orange
You ask what we were doing over there all those years: what it was all about? I'll
tell you pure and simple: it was a noble cause. -- Ronald Reagan
I saw these [genetically deformed] children in contaminated villages in the Mekong Delta; and whenever I asked about them,
people pointed to the sky; one man scratched in the dust a good likeness of a bulbous C-130 aircraft, spraying. -- John Pilger
The US has dumped [on South Vietnam] a quantity of toxic chemical amounting to six pounds per head of population, including
women and children. -- US Senator Gaylord Nelson
Perhaps the most gruesome legacy of Agent Orange is to be found in a locked room in Tu Du Obstetrical and Gynaecological Hospital in Saigon. Here the walls are lined with jars containing aborted and full
term foetuses. -- Hugh Warwick
Monsanto has in fact submitted false
information to EPA which directly resulted in weakened regulations ... -- Cate Jenkins
Monsanto covered up the dioxin contamination of a wide range
of its products. Monsanto either failed to report contamination, submitted false information purporting to show no contamination
or submitted samples to to the government for analysis which had been specially prepared so that dioxin contamination did
not exist. -- Cate Jenkins
will take a long time to clarify the exact consequences of Agent Orange. -- Douglas Peterson, US Ambassador to Vietnam
We need more facts ... There
is need for more scientific research on this subject before factual statements can be made to the effect Agent Orange had
in Vietnam. -- Madeline Albright
International research has proven that, during the war, 72 million litres of chemicals were poured onto Vietnam,
over 40 million were dioxins - there is a link. -- Vu Trong Huong, director War Crimes Investigation
We have over 50,000 children that have been born with horrific
deformities; the link is clear. -- Vu Trong Huong, director War Crimes Investigation
These Agent Orange births are normal for us ... Every now
and then we have what we call a foetal catastrophe - when the number of miscarriages and deformed babies, I am afraid to say,
overwhelms us. -- Dr Pham Viet Thanh, Tu Du hospital
We were wrong, terribly wrong. -- Robert McNamara, former US Secretary of Defence during
again must the US or any other country interfere in another country's affairs.
-- Len Aldis, secretary Britain-Vietnam Friendship Society
should never be forgotten that the people must have priority. -- Ho Chi Minh
Agent Orange was used in Vietnam by the Americans during the Vietnam War. Code named Operation Hades, Agent Orange was part of a defoliant programme
to deny cover for the Viet Cong. The Vietnam War was not the first time defoliants had been used. The British used defoliants
in Malaya during counter-insurgency operations. ICI supplied the chemicals and according to a Colonial Office
report saw it as 'a lucrative field for experiment'. To cut back forest to deny the opportunity for ambush is nothing
new. In England, in the Middle Ages, either
side of a highway was cut back to a set distance to deny the opportunity for highway robbers. What was new was the use of